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Abstract
Title of Dissertation: Awareness of Cybersecurity Threats in the Port of Freetown, Sierra
Leone.
Degree: Master of Science
Taking into consideration the advancement in port infrastructure and technology as well as the
importance of ports in not only a country’s economy, but also the global economy and the
increasing cybersecurity threats on such systems, it was considered important to study the
awareness of cybersecurity threats in the Port of Freetown, Sierra Leone, a port that has hardly
been researched when it comes to the awareness of cybersecurity threats. The research assumed
a descriptive design in order to fulfil its aim and objectives. The research used both primary
and secondary data. The primary data was collected by distributing close-ended questionnaires
to different respondents electronically at the Port of Freetown and the secondary data was
collected through reviewing different scholarly publications, and authoritative publications
from governments, the International Maritime Organization, the United Nations, etc. The
research sought to include anywhere between 50 to 100 participants; only 71 interviewees
managed to successfully respond to all the survey questions. The main conclusion of this
dissertation was that cybersecurity awareness at the Port of Freetown was below average as the
Port is considerably exposed to cybersecurity threats. Effectively, the presence of the threats
and even their materialization makes it difficult to comprehensively understand when a
maritime operator has been attacked and the type of actors involved. It is hereby recommended
that authorities in Sierra Leone start by adopting the universally acceptable International
Maritime Organization (IMO) practices and then plan to invest in implementing measures
supported by the provisions of IMO.
KEYWORDS: Security, Threat, Ports, Awareness, Cyber attack
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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION
Taking into consideration the advancement in port infrastructure and technology as well
as the importance of ports in not only a country’s economy, but also the global economy and
the increasing cybersecurity threats on such systems, it was considered important to study the
awareness of cybersecurity threats in Sierra Leone, a country that has hardly been researched
when it comes to awareness of cybersecurity threats in African shipping ports. This section
will serve as the first chapter of the research and it will contain the following topics:
background, research problem, research aim and objectives, research questions, brief
methodology, research rationale, research assumptions and delimitations, and dissertation
organization.

1.1. Background
In recent years, the interest in cybersecurity, which normally refers to the protection of
both physical and technological assets of organizations, has increased all over the globe
because of several factors. First, digitalization is continuously growing, which implies people
are greatly relying on efficient information systems; second, information systems, including
the data stored in them, have overly complex characteristics (DiRenzo et al., 2015). Third, the
dependence on information systems and their technology as a whole has made societies and
organizations vulnerable to the functionality of the systems (Jones et al., 2016). Fourth, each
year, the number of cyberattacks on organizations are said to be increasing as companies
continue reporting more and more financial losses due to cyberattacks (Jensen, 2015). The
issue is made much more complex when you take into consideration the fact that the world is
moving towards the "Fourth Industrial Revolution," a phrase coined by Schwab (2016)
referring to how technologies like artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles, and the Internet
of Things (IoTs) are merging with the day to day activities of humans, including running
organizations.
The emergence of these new information systems has brought about a fundamental shift
in the manner in which countries and their citizens are involved in global economic activities,
e.g., how they communicate, and how they control critical infrastructure (Chiappetta &
Cuozzo, 2017). Nonetheless, cybercriminals are exploiting these activities by carrying out
malicious activities, some of which are considered as natural disasters and acts of terrorism
8

(Tam & Jones, 2018). Furthermore, the motives behind cyberattacks vary greatly from one
attack to another, including monetary gain, political agendas, and acts of excitement (Tam &
Jones, 2018). Today, it has been identified that cyberattacks not only include cybercrime and
identity thefts, but also threats to national and international security (Chiappetta, 2017).
Some of the most far-reaching cyberattacks in 2017, i.e., the NotPetya and WannaCry,
revealed the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures, for instance how networks and their
assets can impact the economic and social functionalities of different countries (Jović et al.,
2019). Since the maritime industry plays a considerable role in the global transport network,
many consider it as the backbone of global trade as well as part of a country’s critical transport
infrastructure (Kessler, 2019; Newman, 2019; Jović et al., 2019). Globally, roughly 80% of the
world trade is transported by sea (Kessler, 2019). Contemporary information technologies and
systems play a leading role in all modes of transport. They significantly affect the efficiency,
consistency, and performance of transport networks (Newman, 2019).

1.2. Problem Statement
In the maritime sector, ports are today heavily depending on networked computers and
information systems to control the flow of maritime commerce on which the economy, national
and homeland security depend on (Jović et al., 2019); this has also increased cyberattacks
towards maritime systems, as it was seen in the NotPetya cyberattack that crippled operations
of Maersk’s 17 APM Terminals across the globe (Jović et al., 2019). The attack also
highlighted how ports have no specific responses or guidelines to prevent or mitigate major
cyberattacks. In Africa, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) notes that while
governments rush to expand their shipping ports and make them more technologically
dependent, they still continue employing workers who are less aware of cybersecurity and the
threats that come with the phenomenon making the countries overly vulnerable (United
Nations, 2015). A survey carried out by European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA)
on the level of preparedness among African shipping ports when it comes to dealing with
cybersecurity threats revealed that only 23% of African shipping ports are using the Resolution
MSC.428(98) of the IMO, which provides a safety management system for shipping and
shipping ports to protect themselves against any cybersecurity threat (ENISA, 2019). The
Resolution MSC.428(98) was a development of the IMO, which requires all shipping and
shipping ports to implement in their operations by 1st January, 2021 (IMO, 2019). By focusing
on Sierra Leone’s largest shipping port, i.e., the Port of Freetown, it was, therefore, considered
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important to study the country ports’ awareness of cybersecurity in the age of increased
cyberattacks.

1.3. Research Aim and Objectives
The research will seek to fulfil the following aim:
 To study the current state of cybersecurity awareness in the Port of Freetown, Sierra
Leone
The above aim will be guided by the following objectives:
1. To identify cybersecurity risks and threats against the Port of Freetown
2. To examine whether the Port of Freetown is prepared to deal with cybersecurity risks
and threats they face
3. To suggest policy recommendations that can improve cybersecurity management in the
Port of Freetown
4. To propose an effective framework of protecting the Port of Freetown from cybersecurity
risks and threats
1.3.1. Research Questions
The research will be guided by the following questions:
1. To what extent is the Port of Freetown exposed to cybersecurity threats?
2. How serious are cybersecurity breaches for the Port of Freetown?
3. To what extent is the Port of Freetown prepared to mitigate or prevent cybersecurity
threats?
1.4. Brief Methodology
The research will assume a descriptive design in order to fulfil its aim and objectives.
The research will use both primary and secondary data. The primary data will be collected by
distributing close-ended questionnaires to different respondents electronically at the Port of
Freetown. Secondary data will be collected through reviewing different scholarly publications,
and authoritative publications from governments, the International Maritime Organization
(IMO), the United Nations, etc. Since the research will focus on the Port of Freetown, each and
every research participant will either have to be a manager or employee at the Port. The
research sought to include around 50 to 100 participants. Random sampling will be applied to
recruit the participants from the Port whereby managers and employees will freely be invited
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to take part in the research. Both qualitative and quantitative methods will be applied in
analyzing the primary findings. Microsoft Excel will be used to tabulate the data by coming up
with graphs and tables that illustrate the findings of the extent of cybersecurity awareness of
managers and employees at the Port of Freetown.
1.5. Research Rationale
The maritime sector is reactive in setting procedures and standards based on catastrophic
events. To cite one of the most famous cases, on April 15th, 1912, the 'unsinkable' RMS Titanic
collided with an iceberg during her maiden voyage from Southampton, UK, to New York City.
Dubbed by her builders as 'indestructible,' the Titanic sailed on her maiden voyage with
minimum lifeboats and lifejackets for passengers and crew; this lack of safety equipment led
to over 1,500 deaths (Brasington & Park, 2016). As a result, the international community came
together in 1913 to set international shipping practices and regulations for seafaring vessels in
an event called the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) (McGillivary, 2018). Maritime leaders all
over the globe also mandated safety requirements such as loading capacity, durability, lifeboat
and lifejacket ratio, etc. as a response to the Titanic disaster (Brasington & Park, 2016).
Today, the maritime sector is still being affected by what scholars term as the 'Titanic
syndrome' (Zăgan et al., 2018; Trimble et al., 2017; Svilicic et al., 2019). In relation to
cybersecurity threats, this implies that the international community normally comes together
and acts in response to catastrophic events that cause cyber panic. What the international
community does not know is that maritime cyberattacks are happening more frequently, and
this lack of awareness is caused by attacks going unreported or undetected (Zăgan et al., 2018).
Even though researchers have suggested that the maritime sector is vulnerable to cybersecurity
threats, very little has been done to deter or prevent these threats. The importance of the current
research is that it will help shade off this 'Titanic syndrome' by recommending ways that some
of the least researched, yet overly important shipping ports in the world can prepare themselves
for dealing with cybersecurity threats by increasing awareness among its stakeholders. The
research also hopes to pave the way for further research into increasing cybersecurity
awareness among African shipping ports.
1.6. Research Assumptions and Delimitations
Research assumptions are things that are considered as true, or at least plausible, by
researchers and the peers who read or review other people’s research. In other word, any other
person reading a research will believe that certain aspects of the research are true given the
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population, tests carried out, research design, limitations, etc. (Quinlan et al., 2019). For the
current research, it will be assumed that all the primary data presented by the participants will
be a true reflection of the current state of cybersecurity awareness in the Port of Freetown,
Sierra Leone.
Research delimitations, on the other hand, refer to the definitions researchers set for their
own research, which are in their control. Delimitations help researchers to set goals that are not
impossibly large to complete (Quinlan et al., 2019). For the current research, it will only include
respondents from the Port of Freetown, Sierra Leone, and no other port. It will be assumed that
the findings of the research reflect on other West African region ports that assume a similar
level of cybersecurity awareness as the Port of Freetown.
1.7. Dissertation Organization
This section has presented the first chapter of the research, the research of the research
will include four more chapters, which will be laid out as follows: Chapter two will be the
literature review chapter, and it will include the following topics: identifying maritime risk,
vulnerability and threats, maritime safety and security, maritime sector in general, main
information systems of the maritime sector, development of the Sierra Leone maritime sector,
definition and conceptual illustrations of cybersecurity, cyberattacks and the actors, current
state of maritime cybersecurity, and cybersecurity regulations in the maritime sector. Chapter
three will be the methodology chapter, and it will include the following topics: research design,
research philosophy and approach, case study design, data collection, data analysis, reliability
and validity of a qualitative study, and ethical approach. Chapter four will be the results and
discussion chapter. It will include only those two major sections. Chapter five will be the
conclusion chapter, and it will include the following sections: summary, main conclusions,
research recommendations, research limitations, and suggestions for further research.
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CHAPTER TWO – LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Introduction
This chapter will review existing literature on the cybersecurity threat in the maritime
industry from previous researchers and authors. Although the focus of this dissertation is on
the Freetown Port in Sierra Leone, the review will not be restricted to publications of research
on that particular port alone. The rationale for taking a wider-focused approach towards the
literature review is to contextualize the characteristics of the larger industry both in developed
and developing countries and lay down a verifiable background against which the Freetown
Port can be compared and contrasted. The discussion of security in the cyberspace will be
against the background of the conceptual illustration adapted from the works of Zăgan et al.
(2018) as demonstrated in Figure 1 later within this chapter.
2.2. Maritime Sector in General
A functional maritime industry is an essential element for an economically sound society
especially when viewed from the perspective of globalization. This argument was presented by
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2017) who reported
that up to 90% of the raw materials and finished products that go through the global supply
chain are conveyed via maritime transport. According to the report, the maritime sector is made
up of globally distributed entities including state departments; port authorities; privately owned
shipping companies; telecommunications and energy networks; and transport infrastructures
such as seaports, roads, rail and airports. However, the significance of seaports is that they are
not only an element of the global maritime supply chain but they are also the hub of other forms
of global cargo transportation, hence a driving factor of international trade and economy
(UNCTAD, 2017). Such positioning makes the maritime industry part and parcel of worldwide
and continuously evolving networks. According to Hareide et al. (2018), the various actors and
operations that characterize the maritime sector can be identified as either Maritime Global
Critical Infrastructure (MGCI) or Maritime Transport System (MTS). MGCI includes
infrastructures (ports and straits) which have the potential to impose multi-sector and boundary
consequences on society in terms of disturbance (Hareide et al., 2018). The significance of
MGCI is that it includes all assets and systems that depend on certain maritime activities and
can have global implications for economy and system security as well as public safety and
health. MTS includes seaports and waterways and their operators and it underpins the criticality
13

of the maritime industry to the worldwide economy (Hareide et al., 2018). However, the
problem still remains that awareness of the significance of a functional maritime industry, and
especially with regards to its security, is low in many countries particularly in the developing
world.
Tam and Jones (2018) classified maritime industry operations into shipping operations
and land operations. On one hand, the shipping industry and the associated shipping companies
run the shipping operations that are the primary aspect of maritime transport. On the other
hand, the port authorities and port operators are the main actors in the land operations whereby
they, respectively, manage and maintain port infrastructure, and handle cargo operation in
relation to loading and discharging vessels (Tam & Jones, 2018). As already noted by
UNCTAD (2017), ports form the nucleus of maritime operations including shipping; therefore,
they entail vital intermodal nodes for both passenger and cargo transportation networks and
critical border control points. It follows, therefore, that there is unconditional need to install
functional and effectual security policies and systems. Because of the port connectivity
between states, according to Svilicic et al. (2019), they are a strategic interface within the
maritime industry and it is imperative that the business environment (both physical and
cybernetic) is effectively secured so that the maritime operators can deliver their services
efficiently. The cybernetic environment is made up of port infrastructure including the
information and communication technology (ICT) systems and the associated hardware,
software, networks, data, services and the users (Polemi, 2017). Because of the large-scale
nature of port infrastructure as well as the impairment, degradation and disruption of both the
physical and cybernetic environments and systems, Kessler, Craiger and Haass (2018) consider
ports as components of the transport-critical infrastructure that potentially impacts on national
security, safety, health, economy and citizen’s welfare. Further, the large amounts of data
handled by the maritime industry and especially at the port level make the entire industry
vulnerable to cyberattacks as well as accidents, but there are still poor levels of awareness of
the problem.
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2.3. Definition and Conceptual Illustrations of Cybersecurity

Figure 1: Conceptual Illustration of Cybersecurity Framework
Source: Adapted from Zăgan et al. (2018)
Zăgan et al. (2018) gave a concise illustration of the role of cybersecurity represented by
(C) in Figure 1 above. Summarily, all the cyber operations take place in the cyberspace (A) in
which is located the system (B) and protected by cybersecurity (C). (D) represents the
vulnerabilities of the system, (F) represents the cyber threats while (E) represents the cyber risk
(all of which are discussed further in the next section, “Identifying Maritime Risk,
Vulnerability and Threats”) at any given time. Cyberattack (G) may cause (E) to materialize at
any point in which (C) is inadequate. Typically, (G) targets (B) via identified (D). Ideally, (G)
is refered to as materialized (F) which represents specific technical ways of inflicting harm
(Zăgan et al., 2018). (B) is used in reference to all the hardware and associated software used
in the maritime cybernetic environment. As explained by Lagouvardou (2018), the systems are
part of the cyber technology in reference to the use of digital systems to transmit, manipulate,
store and monitor data. A critical feature of cyber technology is that the systems are further
connected to other external systems that present opportunities for interception, access and
modification of software or the data itself by unauthorized parties.
The most abstract definition of cyberspace, according to Daum (2019), is a threedimensional domain in which information moves between individual computers and computer
groups. However, more recent definitions have included technological dimensions as well as
other features such as computing devices that not only mean computers but also network
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devices. As Chiappetta and Cuozzo (2017) argue, the inclusion of the concept of “network”
makes cyber security and particularly information security an extremely wide area of interest.
However, Bothur, Zheng and Valli (2017) add that it is imperative to consider the topic in the
wider context of cybersecurity because it goes beyond the limited scope of information security
and includes the involved assets, even the human operators and consumers of the information.
In agreement, Tam and Jones (2018) point out that the humans in cybersecurity are considered
as an additional dimension and potential cyberattack targets who may even be inadvertent
victims.
The ministries concerned with the maritime industry and trade in European Union (EU)
Member States and also state departments and agencies in the United States (US) identify an
acceptable state of cybersecurity as one in which risks and threats against the essential
operations of societies that depend on the cybernetic environment are under control (Hopcraft
& Martin, 2018). There is general consensus among maritime scholars (Fowler et al., 2017;
Jacq et al., 2018; Meyer-Larsen & Müller, 2018) that states and private shipping companies
must focus on the security of their critical infrastructures associated with the cyber environment
in which the maritime industry operates so as to ensure business resilience against cyberattacks.
In that sense, Jacq et al. (2018) define cybersecurity as a concept that addresses the access to
data and its storage and control. The objective of cybersecurity, therefore, according to Fowler
et al. (2017), is to realize a stable state by installing essential and reliable protections.
Cyber risks, according to Meyer-Larsen and Müller (2018), entail a complex combination
of operational and strategic risks. On one hand, operational risks entail organizational the
performance while, on the other hand, strategic risks concern an organization’s overall
direction and they typically appear from its positioning in the larger business environment
(McGillivary, 2018). Cyber risk is an indication of the vulnerability or opportunity that has
potential to harm the cyber environment and when it materializes or is exploited against a
particular operation depending on the cyber environment, it can result in disruption, damage or
harm (Tam & Jones, 2019). According to Mraković and Vojinović (2019), a realized risk in
practice arising from failure of information systems may cause a shipping company or port
authorities to suffer disruptions, financial losses and reputational injury.
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2.4. Identifying Maritime Risk, Vulnerability and Threats
According to Kessler (2019), shipping ports have in recent years acknowledged the
significance of using modern technologies and especially with regards to data and information
security. For instance, the Port of Long Beach, Port of San Diego and Port of Barcelona have
all been targets of cyberattacks in the past two years whereby their IT systems were infiltrated
and the authorized users blocked from the servers and systems (van Erp, 2017). In
acknowledgement of the serious consequences of such attacks on terminal operations, Kessler
(2019) studied the concepts of risk, vulnerability and threat in relation to the maritime industry
so as to understand how key security and safety regulations have influenced the remodeling of
the entire industry. Risk is described as the likelihood of harm that can be suffered under the
conditions of exposure or use and the likely degree of the harm (Jacq et al., 2018). Besides
operational risks such as labor strikes, accidents, equipment failure and mishandling of
dangerous cargo, Beaumont (2018) points out that the maritime industry is also vulnerable to
security breaches involving hacking, theft, physical attacks and sabotage. Similarly, Newman
(2019) also studied the implications of risks and threats in the maritime industry and found that
they impact on business processes globally and create shipping process imbalances. This
finding is consistent with that by Kessler (2019) who also found that risks and threats affect
business processes by restricting the authorized users’ access to servers and systems in lieu of
ransom payment. Global imbalances occur when ships cannot access their ports of destination
and are forces to reroute, effectively disrupting shipping schedules (Newman, 2019).
Trimble, Monken and Sand (2017) identified five risk categories that occur in the
maritime industry including 1) environmental, 2) financial, 3) market, 4) political, and 5)
technical. In the context of this dissertation, technical risks are seen to arise from constructions
and ICT and, as demonstrated by Trimble, Monken and Sand (2017), they may lead to any or
all of the other four categories. The most common vulnerability factors in the maritime industry
identified by Eiza and Ni (2017) include 1) cargo, 2) money, 3) vessels, 4) people, and external
impacts. Expanding on the findings, Ahokas et al. (2017) explain that the cargo vulnerability
factor is implemented by way of smuggling weapons, people and drugs while the money
vulnerability factor is implemented by ways such as funding terrorist activities using revenues
from shipping. The vessel vulnerability factor is implemented by way of disrupting the
infrastructure by sinking vessels, possibly using weapons, while the people vulnerability factor
is implemented by way of attacking the vessels to incite human casualties (Ahokas et al., 2017).
Svilicic et al. (2019) define threat as an act (or the actor) which can cause harm and, in relation
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to the maritime industry, threats include theft of information and cargo, financial losses,
sabotage and terrorist attacks. These threats are embodied in the activities of states, criminal
groups, terrorists and individuals but awareness levels of countermeasures are still considerably
low.
2.5. Maritime Safety and Security
None of the literature consulted for this review has presented a clear safety and security
theory; rather, there is a tendency for most of the researchers to address safety and security as
distinct but interrelated concepts of the cyberspace, whether in the maritime industry or any
other. Chiappetta (2017), for instance, asserts that safety is a much wider and more
comprehensive idea while Śliwiński and Piesik (2018) place security within safety measures.
Perhaps a clearer explanation is that given by Wilshusen (2015) in which it is noted that
maritime safety comprises a set of preventive/security measures designed and expected to
protect the globalized maritime industry against risk, harm and loss and also reduce the effects
in the invent that such risks materialize. Ahokas et al. (2017) also define maritime safety as the
protection of assets and life at sea from operational and environmental threats, including the
safety of the physical maritime environment from pollution. It follows, therefore, that maritime
safety often entails all the aspects relating to the combination of security and safety. In that
context, one may agree with Chiappetta (2017)) that safety is a wider concept that also covers
security as one of its measures. Wilshusen (2015) describes maritime safety from the four
factors of internal safety; external safety; environmental impacts and human factor. In
explanation, they point out that internal safety is an influencing factor for the damage and
structure stability of vessels and the evaluation of business premises while external factors
include the environment, ports, fairways and the related equipment. The significance of the
human factor is that it is related to maritime safety since more than 75% of the accidents and
incidents are a function of the human factor (Wilshusen, 2015). Environmental impacts result
from the complicated interactions of all the factors highlighted above.
Śliwiński and Piesik (2018) describe security as an assurance of availability, reliability,
confidence and integrity but points out that is has multidimensional meanings. With specific
regards to the maritime industry, Śliwiński and Piesik (2018) observed that security is a concept
traditionally used to point out intentional threats as opposed to intentional ones or those that
arise from natural causes. Before the turn of the 21st century, maritime security was not a
strictly critical topic of security debates especially in developing countries. However, Svilicic
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et al. (2019) notes that the 9/11 terrorist attacks set off a chain of security-related concerns and
reactions across the developed, developing and least developed countries, including the
formation of the International Ship and Port Security Code (ISPS). These were further
heightened by the frequent pirate attacks in the Strait of Malacca in the early 2000s and highvisibility terrorist acts against vessels, e.g. USS Cole (2001), the French tanker Limburg (2002)
and the Filipino civilian ship Super Ferry 14 (2004). Maritime security is thus defined as the
set of preventative policies, strategies and measures implemented to protect the maritime
industry against hazards and deliberate illegal acts. Equally importantly, Eiza and Ni (2017)
add that maritime security must also include a sense of secure feeling of the port operators,
shipping companies, their vessels, passengers and crew against threats such as terrorism and
piracy. According to Beaumont (2018), these threats cannot be isolated from technology (hence
the cybernetic environment) because of the increasing reliance on ICT systems which are also
advancing exponentially. Essentially, maritime operations are information-driven and the
protection of information is one of the first stages of ensuring port cybersecurity as aptly
captured by Zăgan et al. (2018) in the conceptual illustration. Yet, only the most developed
countries are appreciably aware of what needs to be done to be done to protect information in
the cyber industry.
2.6. Main Information Systems of the Maritime Sector
Information flow in the maritime industry traditionally relied on paper which,
necessarily, translated into higher operational costs and lower customer satisfaction levels.
However, as Beaumont (2018) reported, electronic information systems have considerably cut
down logistics costs and increased customer satisfaction by promoting higher levels of
industry-wide coordination. The rolling out of innovative technologies every other day has
compelled maritime operators to adapt their infrastructure so as to facilitate and support
operations that are responsive to market dynamics. Such adaptations, according to Trimble,
Monken and Sand (2017), have made it possible for the maritime industry to increase efficient
productivity. The industry-wide coordination of operations pointed out by Beaumont (2018) is
supported by various applications ranging from the most basic to the most sophisticated,
including text messaging, automatic identification system, email, collaborative planning voice,
video and web surfing. These applications are typically used in operations such as traffic
control, navigation, tracking, monitoring loading/offloading processes and freight
management.
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Apart from the applications pointed out above, van Erp (2017) notes that there are the
key ICT systems essential for vessels in the maritime industry. These include Global
Positioning System (GPS), Automatic Identification System (AIS) and Electronic Chart
Display Information System (ECDIS), and the common feature of these systems is that they
are not directly connected to the Internet. AIS is very high frequency (VHF) radio and is
mandatory in vessels, both passenger and cargo, with a gross capacity of 300 tons and is
instrumental inter-ship data exchanges especially in poor visibility conditions. GPS is mainly
used in logistics operations for real-time detection and tracking of objects in transit such as
vessels or even individual containers as well as aid in route planning and navigation (Fowler
et al., 2017). However, Ahokas et al. (2017) have criticized a number of national and regional
jurisdictions especially in developing countries for not using GPS technology to its full
capability in logistics operations. ECDIS integrates GPS data with data from a vessel’s radar,
speed log and gyrocompass to help mariners navigate coastal waterways and it is mandatory
for large vessels. However, Ahokas et al. (2017) point out that there is no universally accepted
definition of the term “large vessel” which still makes the use of ECDIS ambiguous in some
vessels.
2.7. Development of the Sierra Leone Maritime Sector
Sierra Leone is a sovereign state with its national laws. The Sierra Leone Maritime
Administration was established in 2000 through an act of parliament and the Merchant
Shipping Act of 2003 and mandated to register sea vessels and regulate and develop maritime
practices in the country’s coastal and inland waters (Ministry of Transport and Aviation, 2019).
However, since it is part of the larger global maritime industry and because of the forces of
globalization, it ports are not markedly different from others across the world although regional
developmental factors cannot be ignored (Boggero, 2018). Ports in Sierra Leone, like any other
in the world, evaluate organizational forms, implement emerging technologies and adopt
industry trends in order to increase effectiveness, efficiency and the ease of being incorporated
into global logistics chains. However, with specific regards to port cybersecurity, Sierra Leone
has been in an ongoing process of developing a national maritime policy but there is still no
Maritime Security Act in place (Ministry of Transport and Aviation, 2019). The proposed
legislation, though, is commended for its focus on safety issues because, as argued by Śliwiński
and Piesik (2018), safety is a wider concept that encompasses security measures.
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Over 60% of the cargo into and out of Sierra Leone is by sea freight through three ports:
Port of Freetown, Port of Pepel and Port of Sherbro Island. Therefore, according to studies by
Okeke-Ogbuafor, Gray and Stead (2018), this makes Sierra Leone one of the countries in which
the maritime industry is a key player in the performance of the country’s economy and the
people’s quality of life. Further, for Sierra Leone, the maritime industry has been the facilitator
of new graduate courses in tertiary education including marine engineering, navigation, fishing
technology and refrigeration engineering. According to Diggins (2018), the higher the number
of university students a country produces, the greater the potential for foreign direct investment
they generate. In Sierra Leone, the graduates in the mentioned courses demonstrate to potential
investors that there is a reliable pool of trainable manpower in the country’s maritime industry.
With such developments, the Ministry of Transport and Aviation acknowledges the need for
functional cybersecurity policies and measures. Therefore, it may be inferred that there is an
appreciable level of port cybersecurity in Sierra Leone.
2.8. Cyberattacks and the Actors
As described in the conceptual illustration, a cyberattack is the materialization of cyber
risk. According to Zăgan et al. (2018), a cyberattack has the fundamental elements of cyber
threats in relation to the intentions and goals of the actor and these are categorized into targeted
and untargeted attacks. While there will be at least one intended target such a system and the
data it contains or even an entire organization in a targeted cyberattack, an untargeted
cyberattack will typically have multiple random targets. Targeted attacks are characterized by
techniques such as brute force, spear-phishing, denial of service (DoS), subverting the supply
chain and distributed DoS (Ahokas et al., 2017). Untargeted attacks, on the other hand, entail
malware, scanning, social engineering, water holing and phishing. The most common forms of
attack are DoS, phishing and malware. Boggero (2018) describes phishing are emails randomly
sent to multiple recipients typically with a request to confidential and sensitive information to
lure the unsuspecting targets to a given phony website. The targeted form of phishing is spearphishing, in which specific individuals are targeted via email onto which malicious links or
software are attached (Boggero, 2018). Opening the attachments or accessing the given links
can enable the actor to gain access into the targets systems and cause authenticated by unwanted
and injurious actions to the systems without the victim’s knowledge. As explained by
Chiappetta (2017), a DoS attack will flood a network with data, effectively preventing
authorized users from accessing and using the data therein. Short DoS attacks (quantified in
hours) disrupt operations that rely on real-time data while mid-term attacks (days or weeks)
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escalate security-related issues with regards to fuel and food shipments. According to Daum
(2019), a distributed DoS uses similar methods to DoS but targets multiple victims. Scanning,
brute force, water holing, subverting the supply chain and social engineering are less common
but also have undesirable consequences.
The actors can be summarized on the basis of their motivations, their objectives and the
cyber threats they present as illustrated in the table below.
Table 1: Cybercrime Actors’ Profile
ACTOR

MOTIVATION

OBJECTIVE

CYBER

THREAT

PRESENTED


Government



Social



Disruptions



Cyber war



Terrorist



Ideological



Critical infrastructure



Cyber terrorism



Egoism



Military systems



Religious



National institutions



political


Hacktivism



Hacktivist



Reputation



Knowledge



Hacker



Egoism



Attention



Insider



Political



Disruptions



Government



Informational



Cargo



Cyber espionage



Industrial spy



Ideological



Knowledge



Cyber criminality



Insider



Economical



Digital assets



Organized



Political



Organizational data

criminals
Source: Eiza and Ni (2017)
2.9. Current State of Maritime Cybersecurity and Regulations
As already observed by Beaumont (2018) earlier in this chapter, the maritime industry
has appreciably adopted technological advancements and shifted to modern ICT from the
traditional paper-based communications. However, with the advancements also come
considerable security challenges relating to data about cargo, vessels and personnel as well as
the overall operations of the entire industry (Hareide et al., 2018). Different risks have been
identified ranging from deliberate to opportunistic to completely unintended attacks resulting
in devastating losses. Typically, the cyberattacks exploit the vulnerabilities inherent in MTS
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including telecommunication systems, information networks and individual computers and
devices involved in maritime operations (Jacq et al., 2018). In a typical example from Somalia,
classified by the United Nations (UN) among the least developed countries, pirates have
occasionally taken advantage of navigation data available online to track vessels using radar,
AIS and ECDIS to locate and hijack ships. Maritime cyberattacks take the form of infiltrating
port computers; sending fake GPS signals to reroute a vessel; modifying AIS signals to falsely
report a vessel’s location; and accessing ECDIS software to amend maps (Kessler, Craiger and
Haass, 2018). There is general consensus among researchers that the increasing reliance of the
maritime industry on ICT systems has exposed it to cyber risks and the associated operational
vulnerabilities and disruptions.
Although studies into the topic of cybersecurity and the associated protective measures
are wide and vast, specific awareness into the cyber environment surrounding the maritime
industry is comparatively low (Zăgan et al., 2018). This phenomenon is further complicated by
the fact that new technologies are emerging at such a high rate that keeping up with the most
current protective measures creates a new cost center which maritime industry operators
especially in developing countries consider as avoidable (van Erp, 2017). In contrast, the
developed countries and economic blocks (such as the EU) have developed appropriate regionwide legislations aimed at protecting the marine cybernetic environment. For example, the EU
Directive on the Security of Network Information Systems (refered to as the NIS Directive)
aims at providing legal measures to reinforce the general extent of cybersecurity in all Member
States. However, given that it was enacted relatively recently (July 2016), the implication is
that the maritime industry has remained exposed to threat for long. This literature review
appreciates that there is considerable knowledge of the security aspect of the general
cyberspace; however, implementing security measures based on the available knowledge is
still not happening at the desired rate at least going by the conclusions by Diggins (2018);
Svilicic et al. (2019); Tam and Jones (2019); Trimble, Monken and Sand (2017); UNCTAD
(2017). The least developed and developing countries are the ones recognized as the slowest
in implementing universally acknowledged cybersecurity measures.
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CHAPTER THREE - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1. Introduction
This chapter will discuss the methodological approach that was assumed by this research.
It will contain discussions on the following sections: research design, research philosophy and
approach, case study design, data collection, data analysis, reliability and validity of a
qualitative study, and ethical approach.
3.2. Research Design
Research design refers to the framework of research methods and techniques selected by
a researcher that allows them to choose research methods suitable for their research problem
and set their studies up for success. There are different types of research designs, including
qualitative research and quantitative research, which can further be broken down into
descriptive researches, experimental researches, correlational researches, and diagnostic
researches (Quinlan et al., 2019). The current research chose a descriptive design due to the
qualitative nature of the research problem. The other three research designs mentioned above
are quantitative in nature, thus were not suitable for this research.
3.3. Research Philosophy and Approach
Research philosophy is defined as the perceptions assumed by researchers when
collecting data for their studies (Kumar, 2019). There are two types of research philosophies,
including positivism, and interpretivism. The positivism approach compels researchers to
collect data based on pre-formulated hypotheses generated through quantifiable methods
whereas the interpretivism approach is derived from the fact that human behavior cannot be
quantified and analyzed the same way as physical sciences (Gray, 2019). Positivist researchers
view the world as having one reality that everyone is part of making them subjective, whereas
interpretists believe that factors of social science, e.g., humans, are different from natural
sciences (Gray, 2019). The current research assumed an interpretivism approach due to its
qualitative nature.
Research approach, on the other hand, is defined as a researcher’s way of thinking.
Similar to research philosophies, there are also two broad groups of research approaches,
including deductive and inductive. Inductive approaches compel researchers to move from
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specific to general conclusions whereby they make initial observations concerning a research
problem, then generalize the findings in line with the existing patterns from the collected data.
A deductive approach, on the other hand, compels researchers to generalize theories and the
conduct a study to analyze or test the pre-existing hypotheses based on those theories
(Silverman, 2016). The current research assumed the inductive approach, because no
hypotheses were formulated. In addition to this, the inductive approach is best suited for the
interpretivism philosophy as it allows researchers to enjoy flexibility when collecting and
analyzing their data since it does not depend on a single theory (Silverman, 2016).
3.4. Case Study Design
A case study refers to a type of empirical inquiry that investigates a phenomenon within
its real-life context. As it is mostly used in social sciences, case studies are derived from a
thorough investigation of a single individual, group, or event to study the causes of underlying
principles. By making use of a case study design, a research can investigate a phenomenon in
its historical, social, economic, technological, and/or cultural contexts (Glesne, 2016). As
discussed earlier, the current research assumed a qualitative approach because of the nature of
the research problem. The case study design, on the other hand, was chosen because the aim of
the research was to investigate and observe the research problem in the environment of the key
operators of the Sierra Leone maritime sector. The case study approach allowed one to collect
the opinions and views of different stakeholders at the Port of Freetown with regards to the
awareness of cybersecurity threats faced by shipping ports. Finally, the case study approach
was deemed important as it would allow to one form a comprehensive conception of the current
state of cybersecurity at the Port of Freetown, Sierra Leone.
3.5. Data Collection
Since the research focused on the Port of Freetown, each and every research participant
had to either be a manager or employee at the Port. The research sought to include around 50
to 100 participants. Random sampling was applied to recruit the participants from the Port
whereby managers and employees were freely invited to take part in the research. The current
research used structured interviews to collect data from the participants. Structured interviews
are a type of data collection method used in survey research wherein every interviewee is
presented with exactly the same questions in a similar order. The advantage of such an
approach is that it allows researchers to reliably aggregate their data and make confident
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comparisons between sample subgroups and/or between different survey periods (Mohajan,
2018).
The survey instrument was developed with three themes in mind that were identified
while conducting the preliminary literature review: (1) operational environment of the Port of
Sierra Leone, and (2) the current state of cybersecurity at the Port of Freetown, and (3) the
awareness of cybersecurity threats at the Port of Freetown and mitigation measures. The survey
instrument consisted of 19 questions, which can be retrieved from Appendix One of this
research. The Port was contacted via telephone and the researcher was channeled to the
responsible authority who was informed of the objective of the research, wherein they provided
an email that a link to the survey and consent form would be shared with other members of the
Port. The survey instrument and consent form were sent to the participants via SurveyMonkey,
which would allow the participants to freely respond to the questions online at a time of their
choosing.
3.6. Data Analysis
Both qualitative and quantitative methods were applied in analyzing the primary
findings. Microsoft Excel was used to tabulate the data by coming up with graphs and tables
that illustrate the findings of the extent of cybersecurity awareness of managers and employees
at the Port of Freetown. The research, however, did not look into the statistical significance of
the results and the level of heterogeneity, which can only be confirmed through advanced
statistical analysis.
3.7. Reliability and validity
In a qualitative research, issues about reliability and validity are evaluated using means
such as reflexivity, confirmability, dependability, transferability, and credibility (Attia & Edge,
2017). In this research, reflexivity was not a concern, because the survey was carried out online,
thus there was no way of telling how the researcher-researched relationship affected the data
collection. Nonetheless, it was important to look into the other four factors mentioned above.
Credibility of a research is the confidence level one places on its findings (Attia & Edge, 2017).
Credibility was confirmed by looking at persistent observations, which is the process of
identifying the most relevant elements and traits relating to the research problem.
Confirmability and dependability, on the other hand, is the extent to which the results of a study
can be confirmed by other researchers or the stability of the results over time (Attia & Edge,
2017). For the current research, the confirmability and dependability will be established by
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comparing the results to the results of other similar studies. This will be done in the discussion
section. Finally, transferability is the extent to which the results of a research can be transferred
to a different context or setting (Attia & Edge, 2017). In order to establish the transferability
of this research, the results will be compared to studies that have focused on cybersecurity
awareness in other types of organizations so as to check the level of awareness and mitigation
measures of cybersecurity threats in place.
3.8. Ethical Approach
The ethical approach of this study considered three important factors, including
competing agendas, confidentiality and privacy, and informed consent. Before this study was
conducted, employees and managers at the Port of Freetown were made aware of what the
research will involve to ensure they have all the relevant information prior to agreeing to taking
part. Consent was sought from the managers and employees at the Port to use the information
they will present so as to come up with the findings of this study, which might be shared in
other academic publications. The participants were also provided with contact details of the
lead researcher and lead research supervisor in case they wanted further clarifications
concerning the research.
For the confidentiality and privacy of the participants, the research did not collect any
personal information from the interviewees such as their names, email or phone numbers, and
even their position at the company. All the participants remained anonymous.
Finally, when it came to competing agendas, it was important to balance between
professional obligation and intellectual curiosity by the lead research. Thus, the research was
approach with a sense of ‘doublemindedness.’
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CHAPTER FOUR - RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
4.1. Introduction
The methodological approach of the current research was presented in the previous
chapter. This chapter will present the primary findings of the research, including a discussion
of how the results relate to past studies.
4.2. Results
This results section will be layout according to the three themes, which were earlier
identified during the preliminary review that assisted in formulating the survey questions. The
sections include: (1) operational environment of the Port of Sierra Leone, and (2) the current
state of cybersecurity at the Port of Freetown, and (3) the awareness of cybersecurity threats at
the Port of Freetown and mitigation measures. It is important to remember that the research
sought to include anywhere between 50 to 100 participants; only 71 interviewees managed to
successfully respond to all the survey questions.
4.2.1. Operational Environment of the Port of Freetown
The first four questions were meant to evaluate the operational environment of the Port
of Sierra Leone in order to for the reader to understand whether the environment is vulnerable
to cybersecurity threats.
Question 1: Which of the following, if any, does the Port of Freetown currently use or have?
This question sought to understand the most prevalent online service at the Port of
Freetown. 'Email addresses for managers and employees' was ranked as the most prevalent
online service (80.1%), followed by use of 'website' (60.3%) and then 'online banking' (38.7%)
(see Fig. 2 below). It was a concern as most respondents did not take into consideration
business transactions by customers as important factors, i.e., placement of orders and booking
along with other financial transactions.
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Figure 2: Prevalent Online Services at the Port of Freetown
Question 2: To what extent are online services an important part of the operations at the
Port of Freetown provides?
This question was meant to establish whether the Port of Freetown highly depends on
online services as much as they actually use them. A combined total of 32.6% of the
respondents felt that online services were either 'important' or 'very important' to the Port
operations (see Fig. 3 below). A combined total of 46.0% of the respondents felt that online
services are not at the core of the Port’s operations, i.e., 'not very important' or 'not at all
important.' Only 21.3% of the respondents chose the neutral option. This implies that the
negative responses were more than the positive responses; such a finding might be viewed as
a common-sense expectation taking into consideration the fact that the Port’s employees do
not highly deem online services as an important part of their operations. It also highlights the
fact that the Port does not recognize their business dependence on online services as much as
they use them.
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Figure 3: Online Services at the Core of Business Operations
Question 3: How many employees in the Port of Freetown use personally-owned devices?
The use of personally-owned devices is considered as one of the major causes of
cybersecurity threats especially in organizations that have not implemented the necessary
measures for employees to protect themselves against any cybersecurity breach (Herrera et al.,
2017). It should be noted that while a majority of the respondents believed that employees used
their own devices at the Port for work, the proportion decreased as the value went up (see Fig.
4 below).
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Figure 4: Staff Using Personally-Owned Devices for Work
Question 4: How important are these externally-hosted web services to the Port of Freetown?
Less than half the respondents (42.4%) deemed externally-hosted web services as a
'important' part of the Port’s operations. 39% of the respondents considered externally-hosted
web services as either 'not at all important' or 'not very important' to the Port’s operations. A
further 18.6% were 'neutral' to the criticality of externally-hosted web services (see Fig. 5
below).
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Figure 5: Importance of Externally-Hosted Web Services
4.2.2. The Current State of Cybersecurity at the Port of Freetown
Questions 5 to 9 were used to evaluate the current state of cybersecurity at the Port of
Sierra Leone in order to for the reader to understand some of the cybersecurity incidents the
Port has faced in the past and their implications.
Question 5: Which of the following have happened to at the Port of Freetown in the last 1
year? and Question 6: As far as you know, what or who was the source of the attack or
breach?
The most common type of attack or breach experienced at the Port over the last 12 months
was malware, spyware or viruses (75.8%) as well as stealing money through fake websites or
fraudulent emails (33.5%). Other breaches noted by the respondents include: denial-of-service
attacks (17.6%) and unauthorized access (19.2%) (see Fig. 6 below). Fig. 6 below is
comparable to Fig. 7 below in that the main source most of the breaches and attacks was emails,
attachments on the emails, and websites (53.8%). The other major source of breach was
malware authors (38.5%). This pointed to the fact that the Port of Freetown was massively
plagued by viruses and malware sent via websites and email attachments. Considering that the
Port operation heavily depends on networked computers.
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Figure 7: Sources of Attacks
Question 7: Roughly how much do you believe the attacks or breaches you have selected in
Question 5 cost the Port of Freetown financially?
Over a third of the respondents (34.1%) were not aware of the financial costs of the
attacks, with almost a similar number of respondents (33.5%) projecting the that attacks costed
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less the $500. Even though the average cost of an attack could not be measured correctly,
because of insufficient information, most of the respondents had a feeling that the attacks cost
the Port less than $1,000 (70.8) (see Fig. 8 below).
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Figure 8: Cost of Attacks
Question 8: How was the attacks or breach in Question 5 identified?
Nearly half (48.4%) of the attacks were detected by anti-malware or anti-virus program.
The second most common method of identification was business disruption (22.5%), i.e.,
whenever there was a disruption to the Port’s operations, they look into possibility of a
cyberattack as the cause of disruption. The third most common method of identification as
noted by the respondents was an accident (21.4%). The fact the 21.4% of the incidents were
identified through accident implied that a large number of the breaches were not detected. The
more proactive methods, i.e., internal security monitoring and reports from staff or contractors,
were ranked at 13.2% and 14.8%, respectively (see Fig. 9 below). Even though a small
percentage of the attacks were identified through internally set measures, it still indicates that
the Port has an organizational structure for cybersecurity threats, i.e., internal control
mechanisms are active within the Port to some extent.
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Figure 9: Ways of Identifying Breaches
Question 9: In which of the following ways below have the attacked you experienced in
Question 5 have these impacted the Port of Freetown?
Even though, according to Fig. 10 below, there was a considerable variety in replies
regarding the impact of the attacks, two impacts stood out including high recovery costs
(46.2%) and preventing staff from carrying out their daily tasks (53.8%). These impacts can be
considered as direct consequences of disruption to the Port’s continuity. Also, being forced to
implement new ways of mitigating future attacks was also an impact of the attacks (22.0%).
Only 1.6% of the respondents felt that the attacks caused loss of revenue to the Port, while an
additional 6.6% of the respondents felt that the attacks damaged the reputation of the port.
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Figure 10: Impact of Attacks
4.2.3. The Awareness of Cybersecurity Threats at the Port of Freetown and Mitigation
Measures
The rest of the questions in the survey instrument were used to evaluate the level of
cybersecurity threats at the Port of Freetown and the mitigation measures put in place by the
Port.
Question 10: Which of the following issues are included in your cyber security-related
policies, or policy?
Less than half of the participants (42.4%) were not aware of any formal cybersecurity
policies within the Port. 44.5% of the respondents were aware of the security aspects of
removable devices and 32.9% were aware of the acceptable behavior of Port staff. 29.6% of
the participants were aware of the fact that personally-owned devices can cause security
problems to the Port. Others (24.1%) were also aware of the potential problems that cloud
computing might bring to the Port as well as remote working (29.9%) (see Fig. 11 below).
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Figure 11: Awareness of Cybersecurity Policies
Question 11: How low or high of a priority is cybersecurity the Port of Freetown’s
management?
Exactly 35.4% of the respondents felt that cybersecurity was a 'very low' or 'low' priority
to the management of the Port. Another 32.1% of the persons surveyed felt that cybersecurity
was a 'very high' or 'high' priority to the management of the Port, while the rest 32.6% were
neutral (see Fig. 12 below).
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Figure 12: Priority of Cybersecurity
Question 12: Over the last 1 year, has the Port of Freetown provided workers with internal
cyber security trainings?
36.9% of the respondents were not aware of any internal cybersecurity training that had
taken place in the Port within the last 12 months. 55.8% of the respondents were aware of at
least one training of cybersecurity awareness training that had taken place at the Port within
the last 12 months (see Fig. 13 below). The lack of awareness can be attributed to the fact that
perhaps not each and every employee at the Port of Freetown is trained on cybersecurity issues.
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Figure 13: Frequency of Cybersecurity Training
Question 13: Please select some of the risk management or governance arrangements you
have in place
28.% of the respondents were not aware of the existence of any risk management or
governance arrangements at the Port (Chiappetta, 2017). The respondents who were aware of
the risk management or governance arrangements present at the Port ticked employees tasked
with dealing with cybersecurity (41.8%), board members tasked with dealing with
cybersecurity (36.0%). This meant that cybersecurity within the Port was mainly managed
through internal mechanisms involving human factors. Nearly 30.2% of the respondents
claimed to be aware of the policies dealing with cybersecurity, and 22.6% of the respondents
seemed to be aware of the fact that the Port outsources cybersecurity experts. Finally, 14.0%
of the participants claimed that a business continuity plan was in place in case of a cyberattack
(see Fig. 14 below).
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Figure 14: Risk Management and Governance Arrangements
Question 14: Please select all of the rules that you have in place from the list below
82.0% of the respondents confirmed that the Port had some form of rule to manage
cybersecurity risks. Along the rules chosen by the respondents included regular checks
(68.3%), ad-hoc checks (27.4%), and internal audits (22.6%). This pointed to the fact that the
Port carried regular checks on their cybersecurity threats (see Fig. 15 below).
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Figure 15: Rules of Identifying Cybersecurity Risks
Question 15: Do you have insurance which would cover you in the event of a cyber security
breach or attack?
Insurance grants businesses an extra layer of protection in case of financial loss as a way
of risk management (Chiappetta & Cuozzo, 2017). Nonetheless, insurance seemed to not be a
crucial part of the Port’s operations as only 9.1% of the respondents were aware of the fact that
the Port has an insurance cover on cybersecurity (see Fig. 16 below).
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Figure 16: Insurance Cover
Question 16: Where are the attacks or breaches reported to?
More than 50% of the respondents thought that the best place of reporting any attack or
breach is to the police. Other respondents (17.4%) chose the National Intelligence Service
(NIS). Antivirus companies were ranked at 30.5% while credit card companies and bank were
ranked at 19.2%. Other options included website administrators (17.7%), ISPs (18.9%), and
outsources cybersecurity providers (27.1%). The above findings pointed to the fact that the
Port reported both to public and private agencies when faced with cyberattacks (see Fig. 17
below).
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Question 17: From where have you sought guidance, advice or information on the
cybersecurity threats that the Port of Freetown faces?
A majority of the respondents (54.3%) searched for information on major web portals on
ways of managing cybersecurity threats. 29.6% of the respondents used government websites
and a further 29.9% of the respondents consulted with their colleagues and other experts at the
Port. 12.2% of the respondents sought information from the senior management. This finding
meant that information sharing was more frequent among staff compared to staff and the senior
management at the Port. When it came to public organizations, the NIS (6.4%) and police
(6.7%) were not used to a large extent (see Fig. 18 below).
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Question 18: Are you aware of any of the following initiatives and standards?
44.8% of the respondents were not aware of any accreditation standards or schemes
relating to cybersecurity. 31.4% of the respondents were aware of the ISO 27001 and 44.8%
were aware of NIST Cybersecurity Framework. Government guidance was familiar to 6.7% of
the respondents, while a further 13.1% of the respondents were aware of a Security Operation
Center that can help the Port. The apparent lack of Sierra Leone’s Government guidance might
point to poor support from the government (see Fig. 19 below).
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Figure 19: Awareness of Standards and Initiatives
Question 19: Which of the following, if any, do your clients require you to have or adhere
to?
63.7% of the respondents were not aware of the Port’s client were supposed to adhere to
any cybersecurity standard. 26.8% of the respondents claimed that the clients need to adhere
to Government’s schemes while 18.0% of the respondents claimed that the clients need to
adhere to the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (see Fig. 20 below).
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4.3. Discussion
When it came to understanding the extent to which the Port of Freetown is exposed to
cybersecurity risks, it was noted that the Port highly depends on online services, use of
externally-hosted web services, and use of personally-owned devices as work, which makes
them highly susceptible to risk. 77.7% of the respondents used personally-owned devices to
some extent in their work operations, plus the Port also heavily relied on externally-hosted web
services. The dependence of online services blurs spatial and temporal boundaries of traditional
business management, something which most developing countries such as Sierra Leone are
accustomed to. This trend has also encouraged the use of externally-hosted web services and
personally-owned devices, which poses a great risk to organizations such as the Port of
Freetown (DiRenzo et al., 2015). Personally-owned devices that retain business information
can be lost or misplaced, and as a result, it can lead to companies losing sensitive data or their
intellectual property. Furthermore, the use of personally-owned devices might offer a criminal
opportunity to workers with malicious intentions (Jones et al., 2016). For externally-hosted
web services, it implies that all a company’s information is stored in third-party servers, which
are vulnerable to outsider threats. Organized criminals and hackers are known to target servers
that store business information for personal reasons, economic intelligence, and/or pecuniary
gains.
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When it came to understanding the seriousness of cybersecurity breaches at the Port of
Freetown, two issues were taking into consideration, including the frequency of the attacks and
the impact of the attacks. The analysis revealed that the respondents were aware of at least one
cyberattack that had taken place at the Port in the last 12 months. Others noted that the Port
had experienced more than one cyberattack in the last 12 months. The findings were in line
with (Newman, 2019) who claimed that 52.5% of shipping ports the world over had
experienced cyberattacks in 2018. The reason behind this is the shipping ports in most
developing countries do not have sufficient resources to effective detect and prevent
cyberattacks (Tam & Jones, 2018). Tam and Jones (2018) attributed this trend to the
asymmetric nature of cyberattacking arguing that a disproportionately large number of
cyberattacks are executed prior to the attackers penetrating the security and damaging the
system. This implies that shipping ports in developing countries such as Sierra Leone, with
their minimal resources, tend to accept as a norm a huge volume of attempted attacks, and this
cannot be prevented because of the nature of cyberattacks. The apparent lack of awareness was
related to how shipping ports from developing countries perceive cyberattacks.
Finally, when it came to understanding the Port of Freetown’s preparedness to
cybersecurity attacks, this research focused on two issues including the Port’s approach to
cybersecurity risks and how they deal with attacks. The first issue focuses on the Port’s general
readiness to risks, including their employees’ perceptions, internal practices and policies,
decision-making processes, and organizational culture. The second issue focuses involves
arrangements made by the Port to deal with breaches. The overall view from the survey was
that the Port was not prepared to manage cybersecurity risks, because all the questions were
full of negative responses from the respondents. This reflects with other studies that suggest
that shipping ports that are mostly affected by cybersecurity issues have poorly trained
employees (Herrera et al., 2017), no risk management policy or practices (Ahokas et al., 2017),
and poor updates by the senior management on ways of dealing with cyber security (Beaumont,
2018). This implies that such shipping ports do not merit organizational responses to
cybersecurity, which makes them more vulnerable.
The blindness or lack of awareness towards maritime cybersecurity in Sierra Leone and
other ports neighboring country’s sea ports, e.g., Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire,
and The Gambia, has been attributed to the poor lack of awareness of the roles oceans play
when it comes to the development of a country. Such countries shipping ports can positively

47

contribute to their economic development, but are usually crippled with stories of stolen
resources, drowning refugees, and missed opportunities (Pretorius & van Niekerk, 2016). The
consequences are overly astounding. Cyber-attacks are estimated to cost West African states
roughly US$1 billion annually in lost revenue. An estimated 50-60 tons of cocaine moves from
West African ports to Europe annually blindly due to poor systems of checks (Zăgan et al.,
2018). Despite of this, states continue depending on sea trade to improve their economic state
and food security.
Most West African states lack policies for ocean governance. None of the countries
mentioned above, i.e., Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, and The
Gambia, have dedicated coast guards or a body charged with improving the state of
cybersecurity within the ports. Over 90% of the abovementioned countries’ trade is seaborne.
Fishing and food import contributes to a majority of the food security in the abovementioned
countries, as well as importation of oil and gas. The lack of extensive maritime cybersecurity
has made it impossible for West African states to effectively monitor their operations (DoyonMartin, 2015). The implications are not only damaging to the ports, but the states as a whole.
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CHAPTER FIVE - CONCLUSION

5.1. Summary
This dissertation has found that the incidence of cyberattacks across the globe has
increased and that while technological advances are welcome, they also bring with them more
risks and threats. Further, there is a noted increase in the awareness of the concept of
cybersecurity although there are still gaps in implementing functional and sustainable policies
and measures especially in the least developed and developing countries. The research
questions were:
1. To what extent is the Port of Freetown exposed to cybersecurity threats?
2. How serious are cybersecurity breaches for the Port of Freetown?
3. To what extent is the Port of Freetown prepared to mitigate or prevent cybersecurity
threats?
The above research questions were designed to understand the thoughts and attitudes
held by stakeholders in the maritime industry in Sierra Leone in general and the Port of
Freetown in particular given that it is the biggest and busiest in the country. This understanding
helped the researcher contextualize the extent to which the stakeholders are aware of the
cyberspace aspect of the environment in which they operate and how they perceive their roles
and responsibilities. The dissertation described the concepts of risk, threat and vulnerability as
well as maritime safety and security and how they relate to the maritime industry in Sierra
Leone. The dissertation also presented critical maritime-related information systems so as to
highlight the different information systems that the industry operators depend on in
safeguarding maritime transport. Using questionnaire interviews, the research found that
maritime operators in Sierra Leone are considerably aware of both the physical and cybernetic
environments in which they operate. The significance of the mention of the physical
environment is that it is the venue of all the maritime operations, including the cyber aspect.
From the literature review, it was inferred that there is considerable knowledge of the security
aspect of the general cyberspace although the implementation of security measures based on
the available knowledge is not happening at the desired rate. The types of actors have been
profiled as government terrorist; hacktivist; hacker; insider; government; industrial spy; and
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organized criminals. Their motivations are social; ideological; egoism; religious; political;
economical; and informational. The main cyber threats they present are cyber war; cyber
terrorism; hacktivism; cyber espionage and cyber criminality.
5.2. Main Conclusions
The main conclusion in this dissertation is that cybersecurity awareness at the Port of
Freetown is below average because the port itself is considerably exposed to cybersecurity
threats. Effectively, the presence of the threats and even their materialization makes it difficult
to comprehensively understand when a maritime operator has been attacked and the type of
actors involved. It is also concluded from the questionnaire interviews that that while the
critical information systems and technologies in use in maritime operations in Sierra Leone are
numerous, most of the cyberattacks are email-based. Besides the emails, there are also attacks
that exploit the vulnerabilities of ICT systems installed in vessels although these were found to
be less common. However, it was a considerable challenge to make an authoritative conclusion
on whether cybersecurity in the Sierra Leonean maritime industry should be appraised from
the perspective of maritime security or maritime safety. On one hand, cybersecurity has been
viewed as a component of maritime safety aimed at mitigating natural and unintended risk,
threat and injury. On the other hand, as seen in the literature review, some cyberattacks have
specifically targeted a particular maritime operator. The implication, as supported by some
responses in the interviews, is that cybersecurity should be investigated and appraised from the
perspective of maritime cybersecurity because its aim is to protect the industry against hazards
and illegal and deliberate acts including terrorism and piracy.
It is also concluded that only the major maritime operators have the capacity to go beyond
simply specifying cybersecurity but also implementing practical and sustainable security
operations. More specifically, Port of Freetown currently does not have the required capacity
to actually detail cybersecurity as its own security operation; rather, it is still evolving although
the progress cannot be underrated. Summarily, it is concluded that no upper ceiling can be set
for awareness on the procedures of cybersecurity. It is a dynamic concept and the onus is on
the maritime operators to update the protective measures they use. The bottom line, though, is
that the Sierra Leonean maritime industry is generally taking the right direction to raise
awareness of the significance and implications of maritime cybersecurity, or the lack thereof.
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5.3. Research Recommendations
It is hereby recommended that authorities in Sierra Leone start by adopting a universally
acceptable IMO practices and then plan to invest in implementing measures supported by the
provisions of IMO. Looked in the same view as other comparative jurisdiction such as Somalia,
Sierra Leone has made noteworthy advances in port operations. Therefore, in order to improve
efficiency and economic growth, it is recommended that the authorities benchmark using
standards from other jurisdictions in the EU.
Fortunately, West African states have been paying increasing attention to maritime
cybersecurity. The countries are increasingly becoming aware of the fact that they cannot
secure their maritime domain alone. Not even highly advanced nations such as the U.S. and
the U.K. are capable of that kind of control over their ports. This is because the cyberspace
does not have a fence and everyone is a player, including cybercriminals (Greenberg, 2018).
The best chance to ensure a secure port in terms of its cyberspace is through international
cooperation. The AU Agenda 2063 considers the marine economy as a leading contributor to
growth, and the 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIMS), acknowledges the
vast potential of wealth creation of African’s shipping ports. The initiatives call for maritime
education and development of African shipping ports with regards to their views towards
cybersecurity (Peura, 2017). Such African countries as South African, Tanzania and
Mozambique, which record the lowest rate of successful cyberattacks have signed cooperation
agreements among each other to establish maritime domain awareness centers so as to share
information on cybersecurity threats. The information includes detailed plans to improve
cybersecurity in the following areas: marine manufacturing and transportation, aquaculture and
marine protection, offshore oil and gas exploration, and ocean governance (Cheng et al., 2018).
5.4. Research Limitations
The key limitations of this study included its focus on just one port in a developing
country and the small number of interviewees. The focus on a single port may have failed to
generate results that can comprehensively be generalized to other ports even within the same
region given the sharp discrepancies in economic status between developing countries. Then,
the small number of interviewees limited the amount of primary input directly from the
concerned stakeholders. However, the choice of the Port of Freetown was also considered to
be practical given that up to 60% of the country’s inbound and outbound freight passes through
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it. By virtue of being one of the busiest ports in the West African region, it provides a realistic
scenario for investigation.
5.5. Suggestions for Further Research
This study, like most of the existing works that were used in the literature review, focused
on the technical dimension of cybersecurity. This is an important approach given that the entire
idea is driven by technology and the fact that technology is a dynamic rather than static notion.
However, it is imperative to note that operation of technology cannot be investigated in
isolation of the human factor. It is therefore recommended that further research focuses on the
role of the human factor in compromising cybersecurity in the maritime industry. This is to say
that besides natural threats, future studies should focus on both intentional and unintentional
threats posed by humans.
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APPENDICES
Appendix One – Survey Questions
Question Relating to Operational Environment of the Port of Freetown
1. Which of the following, if any, does the Port of Freetown currently have or use? (multiple
choice)
A. Email addresses for the port or its employees
B. A website or blog
C. Accounts or pages on social media sites (e.g. Facebook or Twitter)
D. The ability for your customers to order, book or pay for products or services online
E. An online business bank account the port pays into
F. Other
2. To what extent, if at all, are online services a core part of the goods or services the Port of
Freetown provides?
A. Not at all important
B. Not very important
C. Neutral
D. Important
E. Very important
3. How many employees in the Port of Freetown use personally-owned devices such as
smartphones, tablets, home laptops or desktop computers to carry out regular businessrelated activities?
A. None
B. 1-20%
C. 21-40%
D. 41-60%
E. 61-80%
F. 81-100%
4. How important, if at all, are these externally-hosted web services to the Port of Freetown?
A. Not at all critical
B. Not very critical
C. Neutral
D. Critical
E. Very critical
Questions Relating to the Current State of Cybersecurity at the Port of Freetown
5. Which of the following have happened to at the Port of Freetown in the last 1 year?
(multiple choice)
A. Denial-of-service attacks
B. Access to computers, networks or services without permission (i.e., hacking)
C. Money stolen electronically (e.g. through online banking)
D. Money stolen through fraudulent emails or fake websites
E. Personal information (e.g. customer data) stolen electronically
F. People damaging or stealing software from your computers or network, even if
accidentally
G. People downloading unlicensed or stolen software to your computers or network,
even if accidentally
H. Computers becoming infected with viruses, spyware or malware
I. Theft of intellectual property
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6.

7.

8.

9.

J. Others impersonating company in emails or online
K. Breaches from personally-owned devices
L. Breaches from externally-hosted web services
M. Breaches on social media
N. Other
As far as you know, who or what was the source of the breach or attack? (multiple choice)
A. Third party suppliers
B. Activists
C. Competitors
D. Emails/email attachments/websites
E. Current employees
F. Former employees
G. Malware authors
H. Nation-state intelligence services
I. Natural (flood, fire, lightening etc.)
J. Non-professional hackers
K. Organised crime
L. Terrorists
M. Other
N. Don’t know
Roughly how much do you believe the attacks or breaches you have selected in Question 6
cost the Port of Freetown financially?
A. Less than £500
B. £500 to less than £1,000
C. £1,000 to less than £5,000
D. £5,000 to less than £10,000
E. £10,000 to less than £20,000
F. £20,000 to less than £50,000
G. £50,000 to less than £ 100,000
H. £100,000 or more
I. Don’t know
How was the attacks or breach in Question 5 identified? (multiple choice)
A. By accident
B. By antivirus/anti-malware software
C. Disruption to business/staff/users/ service provision
D. From warning by government/law enforcement
E. Our breach/attack reported by the media
F. Similar incidents reported in the media
G. Reported/noticed by customers/customer complaints
H. Reported/noticed by staff/contractors
I. Routine internal security monitoring
J. Other internal control activities not done routinely (e.g. reconciliations, audits etc.)
K. Other
L. Don’t know
In which of the following ways below have the attacked you experienced in Question 5
have these impacted the Port of Freetown? (multiple choice)
A. Stopped staff from carrying out their day-to-day work
B. Loss of revenue or share value
C. Additional staff time to deal with the breach or attack, or to inform customers or
stakeholders
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D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.
J.
K.

Any other repair or recovery costs
New measures needed to prevent or protect against future breaches or attacks
Lost or stolen assets
Fines from regulators or authorities, or associated legal costs
Reputational damage
Prevented provision of goods or services to customers
Discouraged you from carrying out a future business activity you were intending to do
Other

Questions Relating to the Awareness of Cybersecurity Threats at the Port of Freetown
and Mitigation Measures
10.
Which of the following aspects, if any, are covered within your cyber security-related
policy, or policies? (multiple choice)
A. What can be stored on removable devices (e.g. USB sticks, CDs etc.)
B. Remote or mobile working (e.g. from home)
C. What staff are permitted to do on your company’s IT devices
D. Use of personally-owned devices for business activities
E. Use of new digital technologies such as cloud computing
F. Data classification
G. A Document Management System
H. Other
I. No policy adopted
11.
How low or high of a priority is cybersecurity the Port of Freetown’s management?
A. Very low
B. Low
C. Neutral
D. High
E. Very high
12. Over the last 1 year, has the Port of Freetown provided workers with internal cyber
security trainings?
A. Never
B. Less than once a year
C. Annually
D. Quarterly
E. Monthly
F. Weekly
G. Don’t know
13. Please select some of the risk management or governance arrangements you have in
place? (multiple choice)
A. Board members with responsibility for cyber security
B. An outsourced provider that manages your cyber security
C. A formal policy or policies in place covering cyber security risks
D. A Business Continuity Plan
E. Staff members whose job role includes information security or governance
F. Other
G. None of these
H. Don’t know
14. Please select all of the rules that you have in place from the list below (multiple choice)
A. Applying software updates when they are available
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B. Up-to-date malware protection
C. Firewalls with appropriate configuration
D. Restricting IT admin and access rights to specific users
E. Any monitoring of user activity
F. Encrypting personal data
G. Security controls on company-owned devices (e.g. laptops)
H. Only allowing access via company-owned devices
I. A segregated guest wireless network
J. Other
K. None of these
L. Don’t know
15. Do you have insurance which would cover you in the event of a cyber security breach or
attack?
A. Yes
B. No
16. Where are the attacks or breaches reported to? (multiple choice)
A. National Intelligence Service
B. Police
C. Antivirus company
D. Bank or credit card company
E. Outsourced cyber security provider
F. Internet/network service provider
G. Professional/trade/industry association
H. Media
I. Website administer
J. Other
K. No intention to report
L. Don’t know
17. From where have you sought information, advice or guidance on the cyber security threats
that the Port of Freetown faces? (multiple choice)
A. Business bank/bank’s IT staff
B. External security/IT consultants
C. National Intelligence Services
D. Police
E. Small and Medium Business Administration
F. Internet Service Provider
G. Newspapers/media
H. Online searching generally
I. Professional/trade/industry association
J. Regulator
K. Security product vendors
L. Other companies
M. Within your company – senior management/board
N. Within your company – other colleagues or experts
O. Other
18. Are you aware of any of the following initiatives and standards? (multiple choice)
A. International Standard for Information Security Management (ISO 27001)
B. Any government’s guidance
C. NIST Cybersecurity Framework
D. Other
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E. None of these
19. Which of the following, if any, do your clients require you to have or adhere to? (multiple
choice)
A. A recognised international standard (e.g. ISO 27001/PCIDSS)
B. NIST Cybersecurity Framework
C. Any government’s scheme
D. Other
E. None of these

Appendix Two – Consent Form

Dear Participant,
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research survey, which is carried out in connection with a
Dissertation which will be written by the interviewer, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
degree of Master of Science in Maritime at the World Maritime University in Malmo, Sweden.
The topic of the Dissertation is Awareness of Cybersecurity Threats in the Port of the Freetown,
Sierra Leone.
The information provided by you in this interview will be used for research purposes and the results
will form part of a dissertation, which will be published online and made available to the public. Your
personal information will not be published. You may withdraw from the research at any time, and
your personal data will be immediately deleted.
Anonymised research data will be archived on a secure virtual drive linked to a World Maritime
University email address. All the data will be deleted as soon as the degree is awarded.

Your participation in the interview is highly appreciated.
Student’s name
Specialization
Email address
Supervisor:

Malik Abdul Karim Sesay
Shipping management & Logistics
w1701637@wmu.se
Professor George Theocharidis
***
I consent to my personal data, as outlined above, being used for this study. I understand that all
personal data relating to participants is held and processed in the strictest confidence, and will be
deleted at the end of the researcher’s enrolment.
o

Yes:

o

No:
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